The 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak devastated Asian tourism. The World Travel and Tourism Council ([@BIB12]) estimated that up to three million people in the industry lost their jobs in the most severely affected jurisdictions of China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Vietnam and that the outbreak cost these four economies over \$20 billion in lost GDP. Tourism arrivals also fell by 70% or more across the rest of Asia, even in countries that were largely or totally disease-free. The cause of this regionwide tourism collapse can be attributed more to how governments reacted to the perceived threat of the disease rather than to the real public health danger posed. This research note presents a cautionary tale about transnational crises and how over-reaction, lack of coordination and well-meaning (but ultimately misguided) actions can affect tourism flows. The analysis of the events is suggested to form the justification for new research into national recovery strategies.

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome or atypical pneumonia is a new disease that was identified first in southern China. The world became aware of it in March 2003 when a tourist in Hong Kong infected a number of people staying at the same hotel. Seven of the infected guests returned to their homes in Canada, Vietnam, and Singapore, introducing the disease there. Globally, media soon after reported that a new, virulent epidemic was being disseminated by returning tourists. While tourism is well known in the medical community to be a vector for disease dissemination ([@BIB8]), SARS represented a stark example of an explicit link between travel and the global spread of an illness. A hotel was identified as "ground zero" with the hotel's name publicized widely ([@BIB2], [@BIB4]). Media coverage of airline passengers falling ill ([@BIB5]) further established a link with tourism, as did a variety of subsequent print and electronic media reports, too numerous to summarize here.

While one Harvard academic suggested that 75% of the world's population would have been infected had nothing been done to halt the disease ([@BIB1]), prompt action from the World Health Organization ensured that SARS did not become the plague that many predicted. In the end, about 8100 people worldwide were infected, with 97.7% of all cases occurring in Hong Kong, China, Taiwan Province, Singapore, and Canada. Fewer than 750 died, again with 98.3% of fatalities confined to these five jurisdictions ([@BIB10]). The mode of transmission was identified quickly and within a short period of time, the medical profession realized that the risk to the general population was minimal. In fact, measles is considered to be five times more infectious than SARS ([@BIB1]).

This insight suggests that SARS should have had no more impact on global tourism than any other seasonal influenza outbreak. Instead, the issuance of a WHO "general travel advisory" on March 15, 2003, triggered a chain reaction of responses. A series of specific travel advisories against Hong Kong, China, Toronto, and Taiwan effectively closed many borders. The WHO announcements were unprecedented in its almost 45-year history, for this was the first time that the organization had issued advisories for specific geographical areas because of an outbreak of an infectious disease ([@BIB12]). The Thai government ordered tourists from affected areas to wear facemasks for the entire duration of their visit or face up to six months imprisonment. It also warned that if one arriving passenger showed SARS-like symptoms, all passengers would be quarantined for two weeks ([@BIB9]). Malaysia issued a travel ban on all tourists from SARS-infected countries. A number of cities in China issued similar travel bans that were subsequently lifted. Singapore imposed an automatic 14-day quarantine period on returning residents who visited infected countries. Taiwan imposed a 14-day quarantine period on incoming passengers. Media reports suggested that Asian tourists were denied entry to trade shows, hotels, and cruiseships and that some countries stopped issuing visas. At the peak of the outbreak, more than 110 countries placed some type of travel restrictions on Mainland Chinese tourists ([@BIB3]). The reasons for these measures were that SARS was a new disease of unknown cause, origin, transmission, and treatment. As it turned out, simple and minor invasive strategies were found to be effective in stopping the spread of the virus; yet, what must be termed a panic spread faster than the disease itself ([@BIB6]). Today, the World Health Organization recommends that SARS can be controlled by having departing tourists "answer two or three questions and \[have\] a temperature check" ([@BIB11]). Those with symptoms should be assessed by a health care worker, but others who have had no contact with probable cases require no special measures.

The experience highlights the need for stronger international collaboration and coordination among tourism departments to develop effective responses to cross-border crises. While most are limited in location, scale and duration, SARS was different in that it affected multiple countries and entire global regions simultaneously. The lack of central coordination among governments was highlighted by the sequential, country-by-country unveiling of reactive responses. It fueled fears that an out-of-control epidemic was spreading through Asia when, in fact, this was not the case. Indeed, SARS highlights the need to develop integrated national and international tourism crisis recovery strategies. The need for such strategies is urgent as even WHO did not appear to appreciate fully the consequences of issuing advisories on tourism. While it must be praised for its actions in controlling the spread of SARS, for a period of time it was instrumental in triggering the almost complete eradication of tourism in Asia. Its executive director was forced to go on public record in May to acknowledge that the perception of the threat posed by SARS and its consequences were based on an inaccurate interpretation of information that had been provided by WHO to governments and the public. He stated further that travel was not a contributor to the spread of SARS and that there was no reason why people should not travel ([@BIB7]). Further, the actions taken by central governments not experiencing large-scale outbreaks also appear to have been taken without consideration of the impacts on tourism flows.

The scale of SARS and the level of community-wide panic it induced set it apart from other crises, but it is not a unique event. Asian tourism has faced a number of major urgencies in the past 10 years, such as the feared "Y2K" computer collapse at the end of 1999 and it will, no doubt, face many more in the years to come. The effects of SARS, however, highlight the need for research into the bases and motivations as well as the mechanics and preparation for optimal national recovery strategies and greater international cooperation. ■A

**Bob McKercher:** School of Hotel and Tourism Management, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China. Email \<[hmbob\@inet.polyu.edu.hk](mailto:hmbob@polyu.edu.hk)\>
